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The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of brief reviews
of books and articles (and perhaps films etc.) which are concerned in some way with the
rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human animals. These reviews will be both
critical and reportive--primarily reportive in the case of most scientific and historical
material, and increasingly critical as the material is more argumentative and philosophical.
The second part of this Section is entitled 'Second Opinions' and contains second (and
usually dissenting) reviews of works reviewed in the first part in earlier numbers of E&A.
After a review appears in E&A (and after the 'second opinion' if one appears Ivithin the--
next two numbers) the Editor will invite the author of the original work to submit a brief
rejoinder to the review(s). Rejoinders received will appear in the third part of the
Review Section. Members of the SSEA who wish to submit reviews (first or second), or
recommend works for review, should contact the Editor.
Books
JOHN HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, (PRENTICE-
MALL, INC,) 1963,111 pp., $6.95.
! An issue of long standing in the philosophy of
! religion is the problem of evil. Philosophers! recognize two kinds of evil, moral evil and
nonmoral evil. "Boral evil" refers to the pain
and suffering which results from the acts of
persons. "Nonmoral evil" refers to the pain
and suffering arising from natural causes such
as storms, fires and earthquakes. The problem
of evil consists in noting that, if God is
perfectly loving, then he must wish to pre-
vent evil. Furthermore, if he is all-powerful,
then he must be able to prevent evil. Yet,
evil exists. Therefore, God is either not
perfectly loving or else he is not all-powerful.
John Hick addresses himself to this issue in
his book, The PhilosoEhy of Religion. His solu-
tion consists in argu~ng tnat moral evil is a
result of man's free will. To demand that God
not allow this kind of evil is equivalent to a
demand that he not create persons. For a person,
Hick tells us, is "a (relatively) free and self-
directing agent responsible for one's own deci-
sions." Moral evil flows from the misuse of
this freedom. Nonmoral evil exists because of
the operation of causal laws. If there were
no nonmoral evil, God would have to continually
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intervene in the daily affairs of the world.
When a person falls over a cliff for examplet~e law of gravitation would hav~ to be sus- '
pended to prevent his injuring himself. If
occupants of automobiles were not to be
injured in collisions, the law of ··.nertia would
need to be suspended.
It turns out on Hick's analysis, that pain
and suffering, whether resulting fro~ human
agency or the operations of nature, is good
for the soul. This process of "soul-building"
Hick argues, "must continue beyond this life if
it is ever to achieve more than a very partial
and fragmentary success." Overlooking for
present purposes any problems with this theory,
we are entitled, I believe, to require of Hick,
an explanation of animal pain. According to
orthodox views, animals do not have souls. .
It follows from this that they cannot benefit
from the experience of pain and suffering. If
orthodoxy wishes to opt for souls for animal~,
then we must treat them as our brothers. Wei
must recognize their rights and olace them on
a plane equal to our o~~. If, however, orth6-
doxy elects to deny souls to animals, it owei
us an explanation of the truly frightful amount
of pain befalling animals from both the acts !
of man and the operations of nature. Without!
such an explanation, we can only stand in stu~
pified disbelief before the claim that God is'
both perfectly loving and all-powerful.
Robert L. Greenwood
University of South Alaba~a
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